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Abstract
We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are
strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure
the performance of our algorithms. First, we show that Stackelberg and external regret for
the problem of strategic classification are strongly incompatible: i.e., there exist worst-case
scenarios, where any sequence of actions providing sublinear external regret might result in
linear Stackelberg regret and vice versa. Second, we present a strategy-aware algorithm for
minimizing the Stackelberg regret for which we prove nearly matching upper and lower regret
bounds. Finally, we provide simulations to complement our theoretical analysis. Our results
advance the growing literature of learning from revealed preferences, which has so far focused
on “smoother” assumptions from the perspective of the learner and the agents respectively.
1 Introduction
As Machine Learning (ML) algorithms become increasingly involved in real-life decision making,
the agents that they interact with tend to be neither stochastic nor adversarial. Rather, they
are strategic. For example, consider a college that wishes to deploy an ML algorithm to make
admissions decisions. Student candidates might try to manipulate their test scores in an effort to
fool the classifier. Or think about email spammers who are trying to manipulate their emails in an
effort to fool the ML classifier and land in the non-spam inboxes. Importantly, in both examples the
agents (students and spammers respectively) do not want to sabotage the classification algorithm
only for the sake of harming its performance. They merely want to game it for their own benefit.
And this is precisely what differentiates them from being fully adversarial.
Motivated by the problem of classifying spam emails, we focus on the problem of learning an
unknown linear classifier, when the training data come in an online fashion from strategic agents,
who can alter their feature vectors to game the classifier. We model the interplay between the
learner and the strategic agents1 as a repeated Stackelberg game over T timesteps. In a repeated
Stackelberg game, the learner (“leader”) commits to an action, and then, the agent (“follower”) best-
responds to it, i.e., reports something that maximizes his underlying utility. The learner’s goal
is to minimize her Stackelberg regret, which is the difference between her cumulative loss and the
cumulative loss of her best-fixed action in hindsight, had she given the agent the opportunity to
best-respond to it.
Our Contributions.
1We refer to the learner as a female (she/her/hers) and to the agents as male (he/his/him).
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• We introduce a general model of learning interplay in strategic classification settings where the
agents’ true datapoint remains hidden from the learner, the agents can misreport within a ball
of radius δ of their true datapoint (termed δ-bounded, myopically rational (δ-BMR) agents), and
the learner measures her performance using binary loss. This model departs significantly from
the smooth utility and loss functions used so far for strategic classification (Sec. 2).
• We prove that in strategic classification settings against δ-BMR agents simultaneously achieving
sublinear external and Stackelberg regret is in general impossible (strong incompatibility) (i.e.,
application of standard no-external regret algorithms might be unhelpful (Sec. 3)).
• Taking advantage of the structure of the responses of δ-BMR agents while working in the dual
space of the learner, we propose an adaptive discretization algorithm (Grinder), which uses
access to an oracle. Grinder’s novelty is that it assumes no stochasticity for the adaptive
discretization (Sec. 4).
• We prove that the regret guarantees of Grinder remain unchanged even when the learner is
given access to a noisy oracle, accomodating more settings in practice (Sec. 4).
• We prove nearly matching lower bounds for strategic classification against δ-BMR agents (Sec. 5).
• We provide simulations implementing Grinder both for continuous and discrete action spaces,
and using both an accurate and an approximation oracle (Sec. 4.1).
Our Techniques.
• In order to prove the incompatibility results of the regret notions in strategic classification, we
present a formal framework, which may be of independent interest.
• To overcome the non-smooth utility and loss functions, we work on the dual space, which provides
information about various regions of the learner’s action space, despite never observing the
agent’s true datapoint. These regions (polytopes) relate to the partitions that Grinder creates.
• To deal with the learner’s action space being continuous (i.e., containing infinite actions), we use
the fact that all actions within a polytope share the same history of estimated losses. So, passing
information down to a recently partitioned polytope becomes a simple volume reweighting.
• To account for all the actions in the continuous actions space, we present a formulation of the
standard EXP3 algorithm that takes advantage of the polytope partitioning process.
• For bounding the variance of our polytope-based loss estimator, we develop a polytope-based
variant of a well-known graph-theoretic lemma ([1, Lem. 5]), which has been crucial in the
analysis of online learning settings with feedback graphs. Such a variant is mandatory, since
direct application of [1, Lem. 5] in settings with continuous action spaces yields vacuous2 regret.
• We develop a generalization of standard techniques for proving regret lower bounds in strategic
settings, where the datapoints that the agents report change in response to the learner’s actions.
Related Work. Our work is primarily related to the literature on learning using data from strate-
gic sources (e.g., [15, 12, 30, 16, 13, 5, 6, 24, 8, 26, 27]). Our work is also related to learning in
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) ([23, 25, 7]) and especially, the work of Balcan et al. [3], who
study information theoretic sublinear Stackelberg regret3 algorithms for the learner. In SSGs, all
utilities are linear, a property not present in strategic classification against δ-BMR agents. Finally,
our work is related to the literature in online learning with partial (see [10, 32, 22]) and graph-
structured feedback [1, 14]. Adaptive discretization algorithms were studied for stochastic Lipschitz
2Due to the logarithmic dependence on the number of actions.
3Even though the formal definition of Stackelberg regret was only later introduced by Dong et al. [17].
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settings in [21, 9], but in learning against δ-BMR agents, the loss is neither stochastic nor Lipschitz.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We use the spam email application as a running example to setup our model. Each agent has an
email that is either a spam or a non-spam. Given a classifier, the agent can alter his email to a
certain degree in order to bypass the email filter and have his email be classified as non-spam. Such
manipulation is costly. Each agent chooses a manipulation to maximize his overall utility.
Interaction Protocol. Let d ∈ N denote the dimension of the problem and A ⊆ [−1,+1]d+1 the
learner’s action space4. Actions α ∈ A correspond to hyperplanes, written in terms of their normal
vectors, and we assume that the (d + 1)-th coordinate encodes information about the intercept.
Let X ⊆ ([0, 1]d, 1) the feature vector space, where by ([0, 1]d, 1) we denote the set of all (d + 1)-
dimensional vectors with values in [0, 1] in the first d dimensions and value 1 in the (d+ 1)-th. Let
h? : X → {−1, 1} be an ideal classifier, not necessarily belonging in A, which we assume makes no
error in identifying the labels of feature vectors from X 5. We use the contruction of h? solely as a
modeling tool, and our results assume no access to it. For a feature vector x, we refer to h?(x) as
its true label (i.e., spam/non-spam). Formally, the interaction protocol (which repeats for t ∈ [T ])
is given in Protocol 1, where by σt we denote the tuple (feature vector, label).
Protocol 1: Learner-Agent Interaction at Round t
1 Nature adversarially selects feature vector xt ∈ X ⊆ ([0, 1]d, 1). // agent’s original email
2 The learner chooses action αt ∈ A, and commits to it. // learner’s linear classifier
3 Agent observes αt and σt = (xt, yt), where yt = h?(xt). // yt = 1, if non-spam originally
4 Agent reports feature vector rt(αt, σt) ∈ X (potentially, rt(αt, σt) 6= xt). // altered email
5 The learner observes (rt(αt, σt), yˆt), where yˆt = h?(rt(αt, σt)) and incurs binary loss
`(αt, rt(αt, σt), yˆt) = 1{sgn(yˆt · 〈αt, rt(αt, σt)〉) = −1}. // loss on altered email
Agents’ Behavior: δ-Bounded Myopically Rational. Drawing intuition from the email spam
example, we focus on agents who can alter their feature vector up to an extent in order to make
their email fool the classifier, and, if successful, they gain some value. The agent’s reported feature
vector rt(αt, σt) is the solution to the following constrained optimization problem6:
rt(αt, σt) = arg max‖z−xt‖≤δ
ut(αt, z, σt)
where ut(·, ·) is the agent’s underlying utility function, which is unknown to the learner. In words,
in choosing what to report, the agents are myopic (i.e., focus only on the current round t), they
are rational (i.e., maximize their utility) and they are bounded (i.e., misreport in a ball of radius δ
around xt). In such settings, the agents derive no value if, by altering their feature vector from xt
to rt(αt), they also change yt. Indeed, a spammer (yt = −1) wishes to fool the learner’s classifier,
without actually having to change their email to be a non-spam one (yˆt = 1). Since the agents are
rational this means that the observed label by the learner is yˆt = yt and we only use notation yt for
the rest of the paper. We call such agents δ-Bounded Myopically Rational (δ-BMR)7.
4This is wlog, as the normal vector of any hyperplane can be normalized to lie in [−1, 1]d+1.
5One could think of h?(x) as the label that a human verifier would assign to feature vector x.
6For simplicity, we denote rt(αt) = rt(αt, σt) when clear from context.
7Note that if the agents were adversarial, they would report r(αt) = argmax‖z−xt‖≤δ `(α, z, yt).
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Note that δ-BMR agents include (but are not limited to!) a broad class of rational agents for
strategic classification, like for example agents whose utility is defined as:
ut(αt, rt(αt, σt), σt) = δ
′ · 1 {yˆt · 〈αt, rt(αt, σt)〉 = 1} − ‖xt − rt(αt, σt)‖2 (1)
where the agents get a value of δ′ if he gets labeled as +1 and incurs a cost (i.e., time/resources
spent for altering the original xt) that is a metric. For this case δ ≤ δ′.
Model Comparison with Other Strategic Classification Works. Learning in strategic clas-
sification settings was studied in an offline model by Hardt et al. [19], and subsequently, by Dong
et al. [17] in an online model. Similar to our model, in [19, 17] the ground truth label yt remains
unchanged even after the agent’s manipulation. Moreover, the work of Dong et al. [17] is orthog-
onal to ours in one key aspect: they find the appropriate conditions which can guarantee that the
best-response of an agent, written as a function of the learner’s action, is concave. As a result, in
their model the learner’s loss function becomes convex and well known online convex optimization
algorithms could be applied (e.g., [18, 11]) in conjunction with the mixture feedback that the learner
receives. The foundation of our work, however, is settings with less smooth utility and loss functions
for the agents and the learner respectively, where incompatibility issues arise. There has also been
recent interest in strategic classification settings where the agents by misreporting actually end up
changing their label yt [4, 31, 29]. These models are especially applicable in cases where in order to
alter their feature vector xt (e.g., qualifications for getting in college) the agents have to improve
their ground truth label (e.g., actually try to become a better candidate). In contrast, in our work
we think of the misreports as “manipulations” that aim at gaming the system without altering yt.
3 Stackelberg versus External Regret
h
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Figure 1: Black dots denote
true feature vectors. Axes x1, x2
correspond to the two features.
Dotted circles correspond to the
δ-bounded interval inside which
agents can misreport. Blue squares
correspond to misreports against
action h′ and red triangles to mis-
reports against action h.
For what follows, let {αt}Tt=1 be the sequence of the learner’s
actions in a repeated Stackelberg game. The full proof of
this section can be found in Appendix A.1, and Appen-
dices A.2 and A.3 include detailed discussions around external
and Stackelberg regret for learning in Stackelberg games.
Definition 3.1 (External).
R(T ) =
∑
t∈[T ]
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)− min
α?E∈A
∑
t∈[T ]
`(α?E , rt(αt), yt)
The external regret compares the cumulative loss from
{αt}t∈[T ] to the cumulative loss incurred by the best-fixed ac-
tion in hindsight, had you not given the opportunity to the
agents to best respond.
Definition 3.2 (Stackelberg).
R(T ) =
∑
t∈[T ]
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)− min
α?∈A
∑
t∈[T ]
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
Stackelberg regret [3, 17] compares the loss from {αt}t∈[T ]
to the loss from the best-fixed action in hindsight, had you
given the opportunity to the agents to best respond.
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Theorem 3.3. There exists a repeated strategic classification setting against a δ-BMR agent, where
every action sequence from the learner with sublinear external regret incurs linear Stackelberg regret,
and every action sequence for the learner with sublinear Stackelberg regret incurs linear external
regret.
Proof Sketch. We construct the following instance of an online strategic classification setting against
δ-BMR agents (pictorially shown in Figure 1). Let the action space be A = {h, h′} such that
h = (1, 1,−1) and h′ = (0.5,−1, 0.25), and let δ = 0.1. Nature draws feature vectors x1 =
(0.4, 0.5, 1),x2 = (0.6, 0.6, 1),x3 = (0.8, 0.9, 1),x4 = (0.65, 0.3, 1) with probabilities p1 = 0.05, p2 =
0.15, p3 = 0.05, p4 = 0.75, and with labels y1 = −1, y2 = −1, y3 = +1, y4 = +1. Note that
these original feature vectors are even separable by a margin! The expected loss for each action
α ∈ A corresponds to the number of mistakes that the learner makes against rt(α), which in turn
depends on the probability with which nature drew each of the feature vectors x2,x2,x3,x4, e.g.,
E[`(h, rt(h), yt)] = 0.2 because classifier h makes a mistake for points x1 and x2. Analogously,
E[`(h′, rt(h′), yt)] = 0.25, E[`(h, rt(h′), yt)] = 0.9 and E[`(h′, rt(h), yt)] = 0.05.
Every action sequence that yields sublinear Stackelberg regret in this instance, must include
action h at least T − o(T ) times (because E[`(h, rt(h), yt)] < E[`(h′, rt(h′), yt)]), thus incurring
cumulative loss 0.2(T − o(T )) + 0.9o(T ). For such sequences, because responses rt(h) appear at
least T − o(T ) times, the best-fixed action in hindsight for the external regret is action h′, with
cumulative loss: 0.05(T − o(T )). This means that the external regret is at least 0.15T , i.e., linear.
For the next part of the proof, we show that if action h′ is played T − o(T ) times, then, the
external regret is sublinear. This is enough to prove our theorem, since in this case the Stackelberg
regret is 0.05T , i.e., linear. If h′ is played T − o(T ) times, then the cumulative loss incurred is
0.05o(T )+0.25(T −o(T )) and the best fixed action in hindsight for the external regret is also action
h′ with a cumulative loss 0.25(T − o(T )) + 0.05o(T ). In other words, the external regret in this case
is sublinear. 
4 The Grinder Algorithm
In this section, we present Grinder, an algorithm that learns to adaptively partition the learner’s
action space according to the agent’s responses. To assist with the dense notation, we include
notation tables in Appendix B.1. Formally, we prove the following8 data-dependent performance
guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. Given a finite horizon T the Stackelberg regret incurred by Grinder (Algo. 2) is:
R(T ) ≤ O

√√√√T · log(T · λ (A)
λ
(
p
) ) · log(λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )

where by λ(A) we denote the Lebesgue measure of any measurable space A, and by p we denote the
polytope with the smallest Lebesgue measure after T rounds.
All of the regret’s data-dependent quantities depend on δ, but we omit this dependence from the
notation for simplicity.
8Our actual bound is tigher, but harder to interpret without analyzing the algorithm.
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Figure 2: Agent’s action
space with axes x1, x2 corre-
sponding to features. xt is
the agent’s true feature vec-
tor and rt(α) his misreport
against α. Actions α, β, γ
comprise the learner’s action
set.
Inferring `(α, rt(α), yt) without Observing xt. We think of the
learner’s and the agent’s spaces as dual ones (Fig. 2), and focus on
the agent’s action space first. Since agents are δ-BMR, then, for
feature vector xt the agent can only misreport within the ball of
radius δ centered around xt, denoted by Bδ(xt) (e.g., purple dotted
circle in Fig. 2). Since the learner observes rt(α) and knows that
the agent misreports in a ball of radius δ around xt (which remains
unknown to her), she knows that in the worst case the agent’s xt
is found within the ball of radius δ centered at rt(α). This means
that the set of all of the agent’s possible misreports against any
committed action α′ from the learner rt(α′) is the augmented 2δ ball
(e.g., green solid circle). Since yt is also observed by the learner,
she can thus infer her loss `(α′, rt(α′), yt) for any action α′ that has
B2δ(rt(α)) fully in one of its halfspaces (e.g., actions β, γ in Fig. 2).
In the learner’s action space, actions α, β, γ are multidimensional
points, and this has a nice mathematical translation. An action γ
has B2δ(rt(α)) fully in one of its halfspaces, if its distance from rt(α) is more than 2δ. Alternatively:
∀h ∈ A : |〈h, rt(α)〉|‖h‖2 ≤ 2δ ⇔ |〈h, rt(α)〉| ≤ 4
√
dδ
where the last inequality comes from the fact thatA ⊆ [−1, 1]d+1, the learner cannot infer `(h, rt(h)).
But for all other actions γ in A, the learner can compute her loss `(h, rt(h)) precisely ! From that, we
derive that the learner can partition her action space into the following polytopes: upper polytopes
Put , containing actions w ∈ A such that 〈w, rt(α)〉 ≥ 4
√
dδ and lower polytopes P lt , containing
actions w′ ∈ A such that 〈w′, rt(α)〉 ≤ −4
√
dδ. The distinction into the two sets is helpful as one
of them always assigns label +1 to the agent’s best-response, and the other always assigns label −1.
The sizes of Put and P lt depend on δ and {xt}Tt=1.
P lt(α)
Put (α)
α
βut (α)
βlt(α)
− 2δ
rt,1
− 2δ
rt,2
2δ
rt,1
2δ
rt,2
Figure 3: Polytope partition-
ing for d = 2. rt,1, rt,2 corre-
spond to the x1 and x2 coor-
dinates of rt(α).
Algorithm Overview. At each round t, Grinder (Algo. 2)
maintains a sequence of nested polytopes Pt , with P1 = A and
decides which action αt to play according to a two-stage sampling
process. We denote the resulting distribution by Dt, and by Pt and
ft(α) the associated probability and probability density function.
After the learner observes rt(αt), she computes two hyperplanes
with the same normal vector (rt(αt)) and symmetric intercepts
(±4√dδ). These boundary hyperplanes are defined as:
βut (αt) : ∀w ∈ A, 〈w, rt(αt)〉 = 4
√
dδ
βlt(αt) : ∀w ∈ A, 〈w, rt(αt)〉 = −4
√
dδ
and they split the learner’s action space into three regions; one for
which ∀w : 〈w, rt(αt)〉 ≥ 4
√
dδ, one for which 〈w, rt(αt)〉 ≤ −4
√
dδ
and one for which |〈w, rt(αt)〉| ≤ 4
√
dδ (see Fig. 3).
Let H+(β), H−(β) denote the closed positive and negative halfspaces defined by hyperplane
β for intercept 4
√
dδ and −4√dδ respectively9. Slightly abusing notation, we say that polytope
p ⊆ H+(β) if for all actions α contained in p it holds that α ∈ H+(β).
9i.e., α ∈ H+(β) if α ∈ A, 〈β, α〉 ≥ 4√dδ and similarly, α ∈ H−(β) if α ∈ A, 〈β, α〉 ≤ −4√dδ
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Algorithm 2: Grinder Algorithm for Strategic Classification
1 Set dq1(α) = 1λ(A) ,∀α ∈ A = P0, w1(p) = λ(p), p ∈ P0, η = γ ≤ 12 specified in the analysis.
2 for t← 1 to T do
3 Compute ∀p ∈ Pt : pit(p) = (1− γ)qt(p) + γ λ(p)λ(A) . // distribution over polytopes
/* Two-stage sampling: first, polytope, second, action from within. */
4 Select polytope pt ∼ pit from which you draw action αt ∼ Unif(pt) and commit to αt.
5 Observe the agent’s response (rt(αt), yt) to committed αt.
/* Space partitioning into smaller polytopes. Pt: current polytopes set. */
6 Define a new set of polytopes Pt+1 = Put+1(αt)
⋃Pmt+1(αt)⋃P lt+1(αt), where:
7 for each polytope p ∈ Pt do
8 Add in Put+1(αt) the non-empty intersection p
⋂
H+(βut (αt)) // upper polytopes set
9 Add in P lt+1(αt) the non-empty intersection p
⋂
H−(βlt(αt)) // lower polytopes set
10 Add in Pmt+1(αt) the non-empty remainder of p. // middle polytopes set
11 Compute ˆ`(αt, rt(αt), yt) =
`(αt,rt(αt),yt)
Pint [αt]
. // loss estimator for chosen action
12 for each polytope p ∈ Pt+1 do
/* upper and lower polytopes get full information */
13 Compute ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt) =
`(p,rt(p),yt)·1{p⊆Put+1(αt)
⋃Plt+1(αt)}
Pint [p]
.
/* weight scaling with the Lebesgue measure of the polytope */
14 Update wt+1(p) = λ(p) exp
(
−η∑tτ=1 ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)), qt+1(p) = wt+1(p)∑
p′∈Pt+1 wt+1(p
′) .
We define action αt’s upper and lower polytopes sets to be the sets of polytopes such that
Put (αt) = {p ⊆ Pt, p ⊆ H+(βut (αt))} and P lt(αt) = {p ⊆ Pt, p ⊆ H−(βlt(αt))} respectively. Defining
these sets is useful since they represent the subsets of the learner’s action space for which she can
infer ∀h : `(h, rt(h), yt) despite never observing xt! To be more precise for h ∈ Put (αt)
⋃P lt(αt):
`(h, rt(h), yt) = 1{yt = −1} · 1 {h ∈ Put (αt)}+ 1 {yt = 1} · 1
{
h ∈ P lt(αt)
}
The definition of the polytopes establishes that at each timestep the estimated loss within each
polytope is constant. If a polytope has not been further “grinded” by the algorithm, then the
estimated loss that was used to update the polytope has been the same within the actions of the
polytope for each time step! This observation explains the way the weights of the polytopes are
updated by scaling with the Lebesgue measure of each polytope.
Grinder uses access to what we call an in-oracle (Def. 4.2). Our main regret theorem is stated
for an accurate oracle, but we show that our regret guarantees still hold for approximation oracles
(Lem. B.7). Such oracles can be constructed in practice, as we show in Sec. 4.1.
Definition 4.2 (In-Oracle). We define the In-Oracle as a black-box algorithm, which takes as input
a polytope (resp. action) and returns the total in-probability for this polytope (resp. action):
Pint [p] =
∫
A
Pt
[{
p ⊆ H+ (βut (α′))}⋃{p ⊆ H− (βlt (α′))}] dα′
We provide below the proof sketch for Thm 4.1. The full proof can be found in Appendix B.
We also note that the algorithm can be turned into one that does not assume knowledge of T or
λ(p) by using the standard doubling trick [2].
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Proof Sketch of Thm 4.1. Using properties of the pdf, we first prove that ˆ`(·, ·, ·) is an unbiased
estimator, and its variance is inversely dependent on quantity Pint [α]. We next define the lower,
upper, and middle σt-induced10 polytope sets as: P lt,σt = {α ∈ p, p ∈ Pt : sdist(α,xt) ≤ −2δ},
Put,σt = {α ∈ p, p ∈ Pt : sdist(α,xt) ≥ 2δ}, and Pmt,σt = {α ∈ p, p ∈ Pt : |sdist(α,xt)| < 2δ},
where sdist(α,xt) = 〈α,xt〉/‖α‖2.
Using the σt-induced polytopes sets, we can bound the variance of our estimator (Lem. B.4) by
making a novel connection with a graph theoretic lemma from the literature in online learning with
feedback graphs ([1, Lem. 5], also stated in Lem. B.5):
E
αt∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
≤ 4 log
(
4λ (A) · ∣∣Put,σt ∪ P lt,σt∣∣
γλ(p)
)
+ λ
(Pmt,σt)
To do so, we first expand the term Eαt∼Dt
[
1/Pint [αt]
]
as:
E
αt∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
=
∫
A
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα =
∫
⋃
(Put,σt∪Plt,σt)
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1
+
∫
⋃Pmt,σt
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q2
(2)
Due to the fact thatGrinder uses conservative estimates of the true action space with sdist(α,xt) ≤
δ, term Q2 can be upper bounded by λ(Pmt,σt). Upper bounding Q1 is significantly more involved
(Lem. B.4). First, observe that each of the actions in Put,σt ,P lt,σt gets updated with probability 1
by any other action in the sets Put,σt ,P lt,σt . This is because for any of the actions in Put,σt ,P lt,σt ,
the agent could not have possibly misreported. So, for all actions α ∈ Put,σt ∪ P lt,σt we have that:
Pint [α] ≥
∑
p∈Put,σt∪Plt,σt
pit(p). As a result, we can instead think about the set of polytopes that
belong in Put,σt and P lt,σt as forming a fully connected feedback graph. The latter, coupled with the
fact that our exploration term makes sure that each polytope p is chosen with probability at least
λ(p)/λ(A) gives that: Q1 ≤ 4 log
(
4λ(A)·|Put,σt∪Plt,σt |
λ(p)·γ
)
.
Expressing everything in terms of polytopes rather than individual actions is critical in the
previous step, because applying [1, Lem. 5] on A, rather than Pt, gives vacuous regret upper
bounds, due to the logarithmic dependence in the number of nodes of the feedback graph, which
is infinite for the case of A. The penultimate step of the proof (Lem. B.6) is a second order
regret bound for Grinder on the estimated losses ˆ`(·, ·), which should be viewed as the continuous
variant of the standard discrete-action second order regret bound for EXP3-type algorithms. In order
to derive the bound stated in Thm 4.1 we upper bound the total number of σt-induced polytopes
with λ(A)/λ(p). 
The regret guarantee of Grinder is preserved if instead of an accurate in-oracle it is provided
an ε-approximate one, where ε ≤ 1/√T (Lemma B.7). As we also validate in Sec. 4.1, in settings
where few points violate the margin between the +1 and the −1 labeled points such approximation
oracles do exist and are relatively easy to construct.
Computing the volume of polytopes is a #-P hard problem, so Grinder should be viewed as
an information-theoretic result. However, if Grinder is provided access to an efficient black-box
algorithm for computing the volume of a polytope, its runtime complexity is O(T d) (Lem. B.8).
10These can only be computed if one has access to the agent’s true datapoint σt = (xt, yt). However, we only use
them in our analysis, and Grinder does not require access to them.
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Figure 4: Grinder vs. EXP3. From left to right: discrete A (accurate and regression oracle), con-
tinuous A with δ = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and continuous A with δ = 0.05, 0.3, 0.5. Solid lines correspond
to average regret/loss, and opaque bands correspond to 10th and 90th percentile.
4.1 Simulations
In this subsection we present our simulation results. We build simulation datasets since in order
to evaluate the performance of our algorithms one needs to know the original datapoints xt. The
results of our simulations are presented in Fig. 4.
For the simulation, we run Grinder against EXP3 for a horizon T = 1000, where each timestep
was repeated for 30 repetitions. The δ-BMR agents that we used are best-responding according to
the utility function of Eq. (1), and we studied 5 different values for δ: 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5. The
+1 labeled points are drawn as xt ∼ (N (0.7, 0.3),N (0.7, 0.3)) and the −1 labeled points are drawn
from xt ∼ (N (0.4, 0.3),N (0.4, 0.3)). Thus we establish that for the majority of the points there is a
clear “margin” but there are few points that violate it (i.e., there exists no perfect linear classifier).
EXP3 is always run with a fixed set of actions and suffers always a dependence on the different
actions (i.e., not δ). We then run Grinder in the same fixed set of actions and with a continuous
action set. For the discrete action set, we include the results for both the accurate and the regression-
based approximate oracle. For the continuous action set it is not possible to identify the best-fixed
action in hindsight. As a result, we report the cumulative loss. In Appendix C, we include additional
simulations for a different family of δ-BMR agents11, and different distributions of labels.
In order to build the approximation oracle we used past data and we trained a logistic regression
model for each polytope, learning the probability that it is updated. Our model has “recency bias”
and gives more weight to more recent datapoints. We expect that for more accurate oracles, our
results are strengthened, as proved by our theoretical bounds.
Validating our theoretical results, Grinder outperforms the benchmark, despite the fact that
we use an approximation oracle. We also see that in the discrete action set, where an accurate
oracle can be constructed, Grinder performs much better than the regression oracle. As expected,
Grinder’s performance becomes worse as the power of the adversary increases (i.e., as δ grows
larger).
5 Lower Bound
In this section we prove nearly matching lower bounds for learning a linear classifier against δ-BMR
agents. To do so, we use the geometry of the sequence of datapoints σt interpreted in the dual
space. The proofs can be found in Appendix D.
11Namely, their utility function is: ut(αt, rt(αt), σt) = δ′ · 〈αt, rt(αt)〉 − ‖xt − rt(αt)‖2.
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Theorem 5.1. For any strategy and any δ, there exists a sequence of {σt}Tt=1 such that:
E
∑
t∈[T ]
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)
− min
α?∈A
E
∑
t∈[T ]
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
 ≥ 1
9
√
2
√
T log
(
λ(A)
λ(p˜)
)
(3)
where p˜ is the smallest σt-induced polytope from the sequence of {σt}Tt=1.
Proof Sketch. Fix a δ > 0, and assume that the agents are truthful12 (i.e., rt(α) = xt, ∀t ∈ [T ],∀α ∈
A). Faithful to our model, however, the learner can only observe rt(α), without knowing its equiv-
alence to xt. We prove the theorem in two steps.
In the first step (Lem. D.1) we show a more relaxed lower bound of order Ω(
√
T ). To prove this,
we fix a particular feature vector x for the agent, and two different adversarial environments (call
them U and L) choosing the label of x according to different Bernoulli probability distributions;
one of them favors label yt = +1, while the other favors label yt = −1. The Ω(
√
T ) lower bound
corresponds to the regret accrued by the learner in order to distinguish between U and L.
For the second step, we separate the horizon into Φ = log(λ(A)/λ(p˜)) phases, each comprised
by T/Φ consecutive rounds. In all rounds of a phase, the agent has the same x and the labels
are constructed by adversarial environments U and L. At the end of each phase, either U or L
must have caused regret at least Ω(
√
T/Φ). According to which one it was, nature selects the
feature vector for the next phase in a way that guarantees that one of the best-fixed actions for
all previous phases is still part of the optimal actions at this phase. The general pattern that we
follow for the feature vectors of each phase is xφ =
(
1
2 ,
1
4
(
1 + κφ · 2φ
))
where κφ is a phase-specific
constant for which κ0 = 1 and κφ+1 = 2κφ + 1 if the environment causing regret Ω(
√
T ) was U and
κφ+1 = 2κφ − 1 otherwise. This pattern establishes that the feature vectors are spaced in a way
that every algorithm would be penalized enough, in order to be able to discern their labels. 
12Truthful agents are δ-BMR agents, so the lower bound holds for the whole family of δ-BMR agents.
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A Appendix for Section 3
A.1 Missing Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For completeness, we outline again the instance described earlier. Let an
action space A = {h, h′} such that h = (1, 1,−1) and h′ = (0.5,−1, 0.25), and let δ = 0.1. The
environment draws feature vectors x1 = (0.4, 0.5),x2 = (0.6, 0.6),x3 = (0.8, 0.9),x4 = (0.65, 0.3)
with probabilities p1 = 0.05, p2 = 0.15, p3 = 0.05, p4 = 0.75 respectively, and with labels y1 =
−1, y2 = −1, y3 = +1, y4 = +1. For clarity, Figure 1 provides a pictorial depiction of the example,
along with the best responses of the agents for each action. We first explain the values that the
loss function takes according to the best-responses of the agents and the feature vectors drawn by
nature.
• (E [` (h, rt (h) , yt)]) When the learner plays h against agent’s responses rt (h), she makes a
mistake in her prediction every time that the environment drew x1 or x2 for the agent. This
is because for x1 the agent can misreport and fool the hyperplane. For x2 the agent does not
need to misreport; hyperplane h classifies it as +1 erroneously already. For x4 the agent can
misreport and get correctly classified and for x3 the hyperplane is correct all by itself. Hence:
E [` (h, rt (h) , yt)] = P
[
nature draws x1 or x2
]
= p1 + p2 = 0.2
• (E [` (h′, rt (h′) , yt)]) When the learner plays h′ against agent’s responses rt (h′), she makes a
mistake in her prediction every time that the environment drew x1 or x2 or x3 for the agent.
This is because for both x1 and x2 the agent could misreport and fool the hyperplane and
for x3 the hyperplane classifies it incorrectly, but there is nothing that the learner can do to
change it (due to δ-boundedness). For x4 the hyperplane classifies the point correctly, without
the need of misreport from the agent. Hence:
E
[
`
(
h′, rt
(
h′
)
, yt
)]
= P
[
nature draws x1 or x2 or x3
]
= p1 + p2 + p3 = 0.25
• (E [` (h, rt (h′) , yt)]) When the learner plays h against agent’s responses rt (h′), she makes a
mistake in her prediction every time that the environment drew x2 or x4 for the agent, i.e.,
E
[
`
(
h, rt
(
h′
)
, yt
)]
= P
[
nature draws x2 or x4
]
= p2 + p4 = 0.9
• (E [` (h′, rt (h) , yt)]) When the learner plays h′ against agent’s responses rt (h), she makes a
mistake in her prediction every time that the environment drew x3 for the agent, i.e.,
E
[
`
(
h′, rt (h) , yt
)]
= P
[
nature draws x3
]
= p3 = 0.05
We now prove that any sequence with sublinear Stackelberg regret will have linear external
regret. Observe that for the Stackelberg regret, the best fixed action in hindsight is action h, with
cumulative loss 0.2T . Therefore, any action sequence that yields sublinear Stackelberg regret must
have cumulative loss 0.2T + o(T ), meaning that action h′ is played at most o(T ) times, while action
h is played at least T − o(T ) times. Given this, we proceed by identifying the best fixed action for
the external regret in any action such sequence {αt}Tt=1. For that, we compute the loss that any of
the actions in A would incur, had they been the fixed action for sequence {αt}Tt=1.
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Assume that action h was the fixed action in hindsight for the sequence {αt}Tt=1. Then, the
cumulative loss incurred by playing h constantly for T rounds, denoted by
∑T
t=1 ` (h, rt(αt), yt) is:
0.2(T − o(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss incurred when playing
h against rt(h)
+ 0.9o(T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss incurred when playing
h against rt(h′)
Assume that action h′ was the fixed action in hindsight for the aforementioned action sequence.
Then, the cumulative loss incurred by playing h′, denoted by
∑T
t=1 `(h
′, rt(αt), yt) is equal to
0.05(T − o(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss incurred when playing
h′ against rt(h)
+ 0.25o(T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss incurred when playing
h′ against rt(h′)
Hence, we have that the best fixed action in hindsight for the external regret for the sequence
{αt}Tt=1 is action h′. This means, however, that for the sequence {αt}Tt=1, which guaranteed sublinear
Stackelberg regret, the external regret is linear in T :
R(T ) ≥ 0.2T − 0.05T ≥ 0.15T
Moving forward, we prove that any action sequence with sublinear external regret will have linear
Stackelberg regret. Since we previously proved that any action sequence {αt}Tt=1 with sublinear
Stackelberg regret plays at least T − o(T ) times action h and this resulted in having linear external
regret, we only need to consider sequences where action h′ is played T − o(T ) times, while action h
is played for o(T ) times. For any such action sequence, it suffices to show that the external regret
will be sublinear, since for any such sequence the Stackelberg regret will be linear:
R(T ) = 0.2o(T ) + 0.25 · (T − o(T ))− 0.2T ≥ 0.05T
Similarly to the analysis above, we distinguish the following cases. Assume that action h was
the fixed action in hindsight for {αt}Tt=1. Then, the cumulative loss incurred by playing h is∑T
t=1 ` (h, rt(αt), yt) = 0.2o(T ) + 0.9(T − o(T )). Assume that action h′ was the fixed action in
hindsight for the aforementioned action sequence. Then, the cumulative loss incurred by playing h′
is
∑T
t=1 ` (h
′, rt(αt), yt) = 0.05o(T ) + 0.25(T − o(T )). As a result, the best fixed action in hindsight
for the Stackelberg regret would be action h′, yielding external regret o(T ), i.e., sublinear. This
concludes our proof. 
A.2 Purely Adversarial and Cooperative Stackelberg Games
Despite the worst-case incompatibility results that we have shown for the notions of external and
Stackelberg regret, there are families of repeated games for which there is a clear hierarchy be-
tween the two. In this subsection, we study two of the most important ones; the family of Purely
Adversarial, and the family of Purely Cooperative Stackelberg Games.
Definition A.1 (Purely Adversarial Stackelberg Game (PASGs)). We call a Stackelberg Game
Purely Adversarial, if for all actions α′ ∈ A for the loss of the learner it holds that: `(α, r(α), yt) ≥
`(α, r(α′), yt), i.e., the agent inflicts the highest loss to the learner, when best-responding to the
action to which she committed.
Definition A.2 (Purely Cooperative Stackelberg Game (PCSGs)). We call a Stackelberg Game
Purely Cooperative if for all actions α′ ∈ A for the loss of the learner it holds that: `(α, r(α), yt) ≤
`(α, r(α′), yt), i.e., the agent inflicts the lowest loss to the learner, when best-responding to the
action to which she committed.
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rt(α) rt(α
′)
α (7,−1) (6,−3)
α′ (6,−3) (7,−1)
Table 1: Example of a PASG
that is not zero-sum.
We remark here that despite their similarities, PASGs and PC-
SGs are not equivalent to zero-sum games; in fact, it is easy to see
that every zero-sum game is either a PASG or a PCSG, but the
converse is not true (see e.g., the example loss matrix given in Ta-
ble 1 where the first coordinate of tuple (i, j) corresponds to the
loss of the learner, and the second to the loss of the agent). Next,
we outline the hierarchy between external and Stackelberg regret in
repeated PASGs and PCSGs.
Lemma A.3. In repeated PASGs, Stackelberg regret is upper bounded by external regret, i.e.,
R(T ) ≤ R(T ). In other words, any no-Stackelberg regret sequence of actions is also a no-external
regret one.
Proof. Let α˜ = arg minα∈A
∑T
t=1 `(α, rt(αt), yt) and α
? = arg minα∈A
∑T
t=1 `(α, rt(α), yt). Then:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α˜, rt(αt), yt) (definition of external regret)
≥
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α?, rt(αt), yt) (definition of α˜)
≥
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt) (`(α?, rt(αt), yt) ≤ `(α?, rt(α?), yt))
= R(T )

On the other hand, for PCSGs it holds that:
Lemma A.4. In repeated PCSGs, Stackelberg regret is lower bounded by external regret, i.e.,
R(T ) ≥ R(T ). In other words, any no-external regret sequence of actions is also a no-Stackelberg
regret one.
Proof. Let α˜ = arg minα∈A
∑T
t=1 `(α, rt(αt), yt) and α
? = arg minα∈A
∑T
t=1 `(α, rt(α), yt). Then:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α˜, rt(αt), yt) (definition of external regret)
≤
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α˜, rt(α˜), yt) (definition of PCSGs)
≤
T∑
t=1
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
T∑
t=1
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt) (definition of α?)
= R(T )

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A.3 The Function `(α, rt(α), yt)
As we mentioned in the main body, the learner’s loss function `(α, rt(α), yt) is generally not Lipschitz
in her chosen action α. For that, we study below the quantity |`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)|.
Lemma A.5. Let `(x, y, z) denote the learner’s loss function in a Stackelberg game, such that ` is
L1-Lipschitz with respect to the first argument, and L2-Lipschitz with respect to the second. Then,
for the learner’s loss between any two actions α, α′ ∈ A it holds that:∣∣`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)∣∣ ≤ max{L1 · ∥∥α′ − α∥∥, L2 · ∥∥rt(α)− rt(α′)∥∥}
Proof. We split the set of actions A into pairs (α, α′) satisfying the following properties:
1. For pair (α, α′) it holds that: `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ `(α, rt(α′), yt) and `(α′, rt(α′), yt) ≥ `(α′, rt(α), yt).
In other words, by best-responding the agent causes the biggest loss to the learner. Observe
that, given that ` is L1-Lipschitz in its first argument, we have that:
`(α′, rt(α′), yt)− `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ `(α′, rt(α), yt)− `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ −L1
∥∥α′ − α∥∥
and
`(α′, rt(α′), yt)− `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ `(α′, rt(α′), yt)− `(α, rt(α′), yt) ≤ L1
∥∥α′ − α∥∥
Therefore, for such pairs of actions function `(α, rt(α), yt) is L1-Lipschitz with respect to α.
2. For pair (α, α′) it holds that: `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ `(α, rt(α′), yt) and `(α′, rt(α′), yt) ≤ `(α′, rt(α), yt).
In other words, by best-responding the agent causes the smallest loss to the learner. Similarly
to Case 1, it is easy to see that on these pairs of actions, function `(α, rt(α), yt) is again
L1-Lipschitz with respect to α.
3. For pair (α, α′) it holds that
`(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ `(α, rt(α′), yt) (4)
and
`(α′, rt(α′), yt) ≤ `(α′, rt(α), yt) (5)
From Equations (4) and (5) we have that
`(α′, rt(α′), yt)− `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ L1
∥∥α′ − α∥∥ (6)
We further distinguish the following cases:
(a) `(α, rt(α), yt) = `(α′, rt(α′), yt). Clearly, |`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)| ≤ L1 ·‖α′ − α‖
holds.
(b) `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ `(α′, rt(α′), yt). From Equation (6), we get: |`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)| ≤
L1 · ‖α′ − α‖.
(c) `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ `(α′, rt(α′), yt) Observe now that if `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ `(α′, rt(α), yt), then
from Equation (5) the latter is lower bounded by `(α′, rt(α′), yt), which leads to a con-
tradiction. Hence, it has to be the case that `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ `(α′, rt(α), yt). The latter,
combined with the assumption that ` is L2 - Lipschitz with respect to its second argu-
ment, implies that `(α′, rt(α′), yt)− `(α, rt(α), yt) ≥ −L2 · ‖rt(α′)− rt(α)‖.
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4. For the pair (α, α′) it holds that `(α, rt(α), yt) ≤ `(α, rt(α′), yt) and `(α′, rt(α′), yt) ≥ `(α′, rt(α), yt).
The case is analogous to Case 3.

To summarize, in PASGs (Case 1 from aforementioned proof) and PCSGs (Case 2 of afore-
mentioned proof) the loss function written in terms of the action of the agent is Lipschitz, i.e.,
|`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)| ≤ L1 · ‖α′ − α‖. However, in General Stackelberg Games one can
only guarantee that∣∣`(α, rt(α), yt)− `(α′, rt(α′), yt)∣∣ ≤ max{L1 · ∥∥α′ − α∥∥, L2 · ∥∥rt(α′)− rt(α)∥∥} (7)
Using Equation (7), we show that there are some meaningful Stackelberg settings where ‖rt(α′)− rt(α)‖
can be upper bounded by ‖α′ − α‖ multiplied by a constant. For example, from well known results
in convex optimization (for completeness see Lemma A.6), we can see that this is exactly the case
in settings where the agent’s utility function, ut(α, r) is strongly concave in r, and quasilinear13 in
α.
Lemma A.6 (Closeness of Maxima of Strongly Concave Functions (folklore)). Let functions f :
X 7→ R, g : X 7→ R be two multidimensional, 1/ηc-strongly concave functions with respect to some
norm || · ||. Let h(x) = f(x)− g(x),x ∈ X be Lf,g-Lipschitz14 with respect to the same norm || · ||.
Then, for the maxima of the two functions: µf = arg maxx∈X f(x) and µg = arg maxx∈X g(x) it
holds that:
||µf − µg|| ≤ Lf,g · ηc (8)
Proof. First, we take the Taylor expansion of f around its maximum, µf and use the strong concavity
condition:
f(x) ≤ f(µf ) + 〈∇f(µf ),x− µf 〉 − 1
2η
||µf − x||2 (strong concavity)
= f(µf )− 1
2η
||µf − x||2 (∇f(µf ) = 0, since µf is the maximum)
Similarly, by taking the Taylor expansion of g around its maximum and using the strong concavity
condition:
g(x) ≤ g(µg)− 1
2η
||µg − x||2 (9)
Using the Lf,g-Lipschitzness of h(x) we get:
Lf,g · ||µg − µf || ≥ |h(µg)− h(µf )| ≥ h(µg)− h(µf )
≥ f(µg)− f(µf ) + g(µf )− g(µg)
≥ 1
2η
||µf − µg||2 + 1
2η
||µf − µg||2 (from Taylor expansion)
≥ 1
η
||µf − µg||2
Dividing both sides with ||µg − µf || concludes the proof. 
An example of such a utility function in the context of strategic classification (similar to the
family of utility functions used in [17]) is presented below.
13Quasilinearity in α establishes that Lf,g which is used by Lemma A.6 will be linear in ‖α′ − α‖.
14We use the subscript f, g in the Lipschitzness constant to denote the fact that it depends on the two functions f
and g.
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Example. Let ut(α, r(α), σt) = 〈α, r(α)〉 − (x − r(α))2. Then, we would like to compute an
upper bound on the difference between ‖r(α)− r (α′)‖, where r(α) = arg maxz∈X ;x ut(α, z, σt) and
r(α′) = arg maxz∈X ;x ut(α′, z, σt). Following Lemma A.6 we can define functions f(z) = ut(α, z, σt)
and g(z) = ut(α′, z, σt). Now, observe that function h(z) = f(z)− g(z) is indeed ‖α−α′‖-Lipschitz
(i.e., the Lipschitzness constant depends on the specific actions):
|f(y)− g(y)− f(z) + g(z)| = ∣∣〈α− α′,y − z〉∣∣ ≤ ‖α− α′‖ · ‖y − z‖
where the last inequality comes from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Furthermore, observe that
both f(·) and g(·) are 12 -strongly concave. Therefore, from Lemma A.6 we get that:
‖r(α)− r(α′)‖ ≤ ‖α− α
′‖
2
B Appendix for Section 4
B.1 Notation Reference Tables.
Our model and proof use a lot of notation. For easier reference, we summarize the notation used in
our analysis in Tables 2 and 3.
Variable Description
d ∈ N dimension of the problem
A ⊆ [−1, 1]d+1 learner’s action space
αt ∈ A learner’s committed action for timestep t
X ⊆ ([0, 1]d, 1) agent’s feature vector space
h? : X → {−1, 1} ideal classifier (not necessarily belonging in A)
xt ∈ X agent’s feature vector, as chosen by nature
σt = (xt, yt), yt = h
?(xt) agent’s labeled datapoint, as chosen by nature
rt(αt, σt) ∈ X (simplified to rt(αt)) agent’s reported feature vector
yˆt ∈ {−1, 1} rt(αt)’s label, according to h?
`(αt, rt(αt), yt) learner’s loss for action αt against agent’s report rt(αt)
ut(αt, rt(αt), σt) agent’s utility for reporting rt(αt), when learner commits to αt
R(T ) learner’s external regret after T timesteps
R(T ) learner’s Stackelberg regret after T timesteps
λ(A) Lebesgue measure of measurable space A
Table 2: Model Notation Summary
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows from a sequence of lemmas and claims presented below. By
convention, we call a single point a point-polytope, and we denote the set of all point-polytopes by
P.
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Variable Description
Pt set of active polytopes at timestep t
Pt set of active point-polytopes at timestep t
Dt induced distribution from 2-step sampling process
Pt, ft cdf and pdf of Dt
βut (αt) : 〈rt(αt),w〉 = 4
√
dδ upper boundary hyperplane
βlt(αt) : 〈rt(αt),w〉 = −4
√
dδ lower boundary hyperplane
H+ (βut (α)) α
′ ∈ H+ (βut (α)), if 〈rt(α), α′〉 ≥ 4
√
dδ
H−
(
βlt(α)
)
α′ ∈ H− (βlt(α)), if 〈rt(α), α′〉 ≤ −4√dδ
Put (α) upper polytopes set (p ∈ Pt : p ∈ H+ (βut (α)))
P lt(α) lower polytopes set (p ∈ Pt : p ∈ H−
(
βlt(α)
)
)
Pmt (α) middle polytopes set (p ∈ Pt : p /∈ Pt \
(P lt ⋃P lt)
Pint [α],Pint [p] in-probability for α and p (see Definition 4.2)
p polytope (/∈ Pt) with smallest Lebesgue measure at round T
Table 3: Notation Summary for Regret Analysis of Grinder.
Proposition B.1. The two-stage sampling probability distribution Dt is equivalent to a one-stage
probability distribution of drawing directly an action from density dpit(·).
Proof. The one-stage probability distribution that draws an action from pit is equivalent to choosing
an action α ∈ A from probability density function: dpit(α) = (1 − γ)dqt(α) + γλ(A) . The two-stage
probability is: dpiDt(α) =
1
λ(p)
(
(1− γ)qt(p) + γλ(p)λ(A)
)
. Since qt(p) = λ(p)dqt(α), ∀α ∈ p, we get the
result. 
Moving forward we analyze the first and the second moment of the loss ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt) for each
action α, based on the induced probability distribution Dt, assuming oracle access to Pint [α].
Lemma B.2 (First Moment). The estimated loss ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt) is an unbiased estimator of the true
loss `(α, rt(α), yt), when actions are drawn from the induced probability distribution Dt.
Proof. For all the actions α ∈ A, given Proposition B.1, it holds that:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
]
=
∫
A
ft
(
α′
) `(α, rt(α), yt)1{α ∈ Nout(α′)}
Pint [α]
dα′ = `(α, rt(α), yt)

Lemma B.3 (Second Moment). For the second moment of the estimated loss ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt) with
respect to the induced probability distribution Dt it holds that:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
]
=
`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
Pint [α]
≤ 1
Pint [α]
Proof. For all the actions α ∈ A, given Claim B.1, it holds that:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
]
=
∫
A
ft
(
α′
) `(α, rt(α), yt)21{α ∈ Nout(α′)}
Pint [α]2
dα′ =
`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
Pint [α]
≤ 1
Pint [α]

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Lemma B.4. Let p
t
= arg minp∈Pt\Pt λ(p) be the polytope with the smallest Lebesgue measure
(excluding point-polytopes) after t rounds. Then, the following inequality holds:
E
αt∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
≤ 4 log
4λ (A) · ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
γλ
(
p
t
)
+ λ (Pmt,σt)
Proof. By definition, we expand the term: Eα∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
as follows:
E
αt∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
=
∫
A
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα
=
∫
⋃
(Put,σt∪Plt,σt)
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1
+
∫
⋃Pmt,σt
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q2
(10)
where by integrating over
⋃P we denote the integral over all actions that belong in some polytope
from the set P. In the right hand side of Equation (10), term Q2 is relatively easier to analyze. Due
to the conservative estimates of the true middle space (i.e., the actions such that sdist(α,xt) ≤ δ),
the set of polytopes Pmt,σt contains all the actions that actually belong in the σt-induced middle
space, plus some other actions for which the agent could not have misreported, due to their δ-
boundedness. Now, for all the actions that actually belong in the σt-induced middle space, it holds
that they only get information (i.e., get updated) when they are chosen by the algorithm, while for
the rest of the actions that have ended up in our middle space, they could have been updated by
other actions as well. Thus, it holds that:
∀α ∈
⋃
Pmt,σt : Pint [α] ≥ ft(α)
As a result:
Q2 =
∫
⋃Pmt,σt
ft(α)
Pint [α]
dα ≤
∫
⋃Pmt,σt
ft(α)
ft(α)
dα = λ
(Pmt,σt) (11)
Moving forward, we turn our attention to term Q1. Assume now that an action α belongs in a
polytope pα. Then, there are (weakly) more actions that can potentially update action α, than the
whole polytope in which it belongs, pα; indeed, in order to update the polytope, one must make sure
that every action within it is updateable. As a result, Pint [α] ≥ Pint [pα]. Using this in Equation (10)
we get that the first term of the RHS of the variance is upper bounded by:
Q1 ≤
∑
p∈Put,σt∪Plt,σt
∫
p
ft(α)
Pint [p]
dα (12)
Further, let Pint [p]u,l be the part of Pint [p] that depends only in the updates that stem from actions
in either the upper or the lower polytopes sets. As such: Pint [p]u,l ≤ Pint [p] and the term in
Equation (12) can be upper bounded by:
Q1 ≤
∑
p∈Put,σt∪Plt,σt
1
Pint [p]u,l
∫
p
ft(α)dα (13)
where we have also used the fact that we gain oracle access to quantity Pint [p]u,l and therefore, we
treat it as a constant in the integral. Observe now that the term
∫
p ft(α)dα corresponds to the
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total probability that the action αt, which is chosen from the induced probability distribution Dt,
belongs to polytope p, i.e., it is equal to pit(p). Hence, the upper bound in Equation (13) can be
relaxed to:
Q1 ≤
∑
p∈Put,σt∪Plt,σt
pit(p)
Pint [p]u,l
(14)
As we have explained before, pit(p) = 0, for p ∈ Pt and as a result, we can disregard point-polytopes
from our consideration for the rest of this proof. We now upper bound this term by using the
graph-theoretic lemma of Alon et al. [1, Lemma 5], which we provide below for completeness.
Lemma B.5 ([1, Lemma 5]). Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with |V | = K, in which each
node i ∈ V is assigned a positive weight wi lower bounded by a positive scalar ε ∈ (0, 1/2), i.e.,
wi ≥ ε,∀i ∈ V . If
∑
i∈V wi ≤ 1 then, denoting by αG the independence number of G we have that:∑
i∈V
wi
wi +
∑
j∈N in(i)wj
≤ 4αG 4K
αGε
Observe that all the actions within the σt-induced upper and the lower polytopes set form the
following feedback graph: each node corresponds to a polytope from one of the sets Put,σt ,P lt,σt . So
the total number of nodes is at most
∣∣Put,σt ∪ P lt,σt∣∣, where by |S| we denote the cardinality of a set
S. Each edge (i, j) corresponds to information passing from node i to node j, i.e., the directed edge
(i, j) exists when the loss for actions of polytope j can be computed by just observing the loss for
action from the polytope i. However, for each action belonging in a polytope among the σt-induced
upper and lower polytopes sets, we know that the agent could not possibly misreport, due to him
being myopically rational and δ-bounded, and as a result, the loss for all the actions within the
upper and the lower polytopes sets can be computed! As a result, the independence number of this
feedback graph is αG = 1. Using the fact that each polytope p is chosen with probability at least
pit(p) ≥ γ λ(p)λ(A) ≥ γ
λ(p
t
)
λ(A) we can apply Lemma B.5 for ε = γ
λ(p
t
)
λ(A) and α
G = 1 and obtain:
Q1 ≤ 4 log
4λ (A) · ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
λ
(
p
t
)
· γ

Summing up the upper bounds for Q1 and Q2 we get:
E
αt∼Dt
[
1
Pint [αt]
]
≤ 4 log
4λ (A) · ∣∣Put,σt ∪ P lt,σt∣∣
λ
(
p
t
)
· γ
+ λ (Pmt,σt)

Lemma B.6 (Second Order Regret Bound). Let q1, . . . , qT be the probability distribution over the
polytopes defined by in Step 13 of Algorithm 2 for the estimated losses ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt), t ∈ [T ]. Then,
the second order regret bound induced by Grinder is:
T∑
t=1
∑
p∈Pt+1
qt(p)ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)−
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt) ≤ η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
p∈Pt+1
qt(p)ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
2+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ(p)
)
(15)
where p is the polytope with the smallest Lebesgue measure in the finest partition of space A: p =
arg minp∈PT \PT λ(p).
22
Proof. Let Wt =
∑
p∈Pt wt(p). We upper and lower bound the quantity Q =
∑T
t=1 log
Wt+1
Wt
. For
the lower bound:
Q =
T∑
t=1
log
(
Wt+1
Wt
)
= log
(
WT
W1
)
(16)
Observe now that in t = 1 there only exists one polytope (the whole [−1, 1]d+1 space), with a total
weight of λ(A) and a probability of 1. In other words, all the actions within this polytope have the
same weight, which is equal to 1 (uniformly weighted). As a result, logW1 = log
(∑
p∈P1
∫
A 1dα
)
=
log (λ (A)). For term logWT we have:
logWT = log
∑
p∈PT
wT (p)
 = log(∫
A
wT (α)dα
)
= log
 ∑
p∈PT \PT
λ(p) exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
)
+
∫
⋃PT exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
)
dα

(17)
where the last equality is due to the fact that not further grinded polytopes have maintained the
same estimated loss, ˆ`, for all their containing points at each timestep t and we denote by PT the
set of point-polytopes contained in PT .
Since the horizon T is finite, set PT is essentially a set of points, and it has a Lebesgue measure
of 0. Hence, ∫
⋃PT exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
)
dα = 0
Let α? = arg minα∈A
∑T
t=1
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt) (i.e., the best fixed action in hindsight among the all
actions after T timesteps, irrespective of whether it belongs to
⋃PT or ⋃PT \PT ) and p ∈ PT \PT
be the polytope with the smallest Lebesgue measure in PT \ PT (i.e., excluding point-polytopes).
Then, denoting by p∗ ∈ PT the polytope where α? belongs to, among the set of active polytopes
PT , Equation (17) becomes can be lower bounded as follows:
logWT = log
 ∑
p∈PT \PT
λ(p) exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
)
≥ log
λ(p) ∑
p∈PT \PT
exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
) (λ(p) ≥ λ(p), ∀p ∈ PT \ PT )
≥ log
(
λ(p) · exp
(
−η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(p∗, rt (p∗) , yt)
))
(e−x ≥ 0,∀x)
= log
(
λ
(
p
) · exp(−η T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
))
= log
(
λ
(
p
))− η T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α?, rt (α
?) , yt) (18)
As a result:
Q = logWT − logW1 ≥ log
(
λ
(
p
)
λ(A)
)
− η
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt) (19)
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We move on to the upper bound of Q now. Upper bounding quantity log Wt+1Wt we get:
log
(
Wt+1
Wt
)
= log
∫Awt(α) exp
(
−η ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
)
dα
Wt

= log
(∫
A
qt(α) exp
(
−η ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
)
dα
)
≤ log
(∫
A
qt(α)
(
1− η ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt) + η
2
2
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
)
dα
)
(e−x ≤ 1− x+ x22 , x ∈ [0, 1])
≤ log
(
1− η
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)dα+
η2
2
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2dα
)
(
∫
A qt(α)dα = 1)
≤ −η
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)dα+
η2
2
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2dα (log(1− x) ≤ x, x ≤ 0)
Summing up for the T timesteps the latter becomes:
T∑
t=1
log
(
Wt+1
Wt
)
≤ −
T∑
t=1
η
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)dα+
T∑
t=1
η2
2
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2dα (20)
Combining the upper and lower bounds of Equations (19) and (20) we get that:
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)dα−
T∑
t=1
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt) ≤ η
2
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α)ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2dα+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )

We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By taking the expectation with respect to distribution Dt in Lemma B.6 we
get that:
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α) EDt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
]
dα−
T∑
t=1
E
Dt
[
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
]
≤
≤ η
2
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α) EDt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
]
dα+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
Combining Lemmas B.2, B.3 with the latter we get:
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α)`(α, rt(α), yt)dα−
T∑
t=1
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
≤
T∑
t=1
η
2
∫
A
qt(α)
Pint [α]
dα+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
≤
T∑
t=1
η
∫
A
pit(α)
Pint [α]
dα+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) ) (pit(α) ≥ (1− γ)qt(α) and γ ≤ 12)
≤
T∑
t=1
η
4 log
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
γ · λ
(
p
t
)
+ λ (Pmt,σt)
+ 1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) ) (Lemma B.4)
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Using the fact that
∫
A pit(α)dα ≤
∫
A qt(α)dα+ γ, the latter becomes:
R(T ) ≤ γT + η
T∑
t=1
4 log
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
γ · λ
(
p
t
)
+ λ (Pmt,σt)
+ 1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
Setting γ = η:
R(T ) ≤ η
T∑
t=1
1 + 4 log
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
η · λ
(
p
t
)
+ λ (Pmt,σt)
+ 1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
which can be relaxed to:
R(T ) ≤ η
T∑
t=1
1 + 4 log
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣
λ
(
p
t
)
+ λ (Pmt,σt)
+ 1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
≤ η
T∑
t=1
(
1 + 4 log
(
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣T
λ
(
p
) )+ λ (Pmt,σt)
)
+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) ) (λ(p
t
) ≥ λ(p))
≤ η ·max
t∈[T ]
{
1 + 4 log
(
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣T
λ
(
p
) )+ λ (Pmt,σt)
}
· T + 1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) )
Tuning η to be
η =
√√√√√√√
log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
)
maxt∈[T ]
{
1 + 4 log
(
4λ(A)|Put,σt
⋃Plt,σt |T
λ(p)
)
+ λ
(Pmt,σt)} · T
we get that the Stackelberg regret is upper bounded by:
R(T ) ≤ O

√√√√max
t∈[T ]
{
λ
(Pmt,σt)+ 4 log
(
4λ (A) ∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣T
λ(p)
)
+ 1
}
· log
(
λ (A)
λ
(
p
) ) · T

Since the actions that belong in Pmt,σt are a subset of all the actions in A, then λ
(Pmt,σt) ≤ λ(A) =
1. The set of all polytopes is upper bounded by λ(A)λ(p) and hence,
∣∣Put,σt ⋃P lt,σt∣∣ ≤ λ(A)λ(p) . Hence, for
the Stackelberg regret we have:
R(T ) ≤ O
(√
log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
T
)
· log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
)
T
)
≤ O
(√(
λ(A) + 1 + 4 log
(
4λ(A)
λ(p)
· λ(A)
λ(p)
· T
))
· log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
)
T
)
≤ O
(√(
λ(A) + 1 + 8 log
(
2λ(A)
λ(p)
· T
))
· log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
)
T
)
≤ O
(√
log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
T
)
· log
(
λ(A)
λ(p)
)
T
)
where the O(·) notation hides constants with respect to the horizon T . 
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B.3 Remaining Proofs
Lemma B.7. For ε ≤ 1/2, we call P˜t[αt] an ε-approximation oracle to Pint [αt], if |P˜t[αt]−Pint [αt]| ≤
εPint [αt]. Then, Grinder run with oracle P˜t[·] instead of Pint [αt] achieves Stackelberg regret R(T ) ≤
O(
√
T log(Tλ(A)/λ(p)) · log(λ(A)/λ(p))) + 2εT .
Proof of Lemma B.7. We start by computing how the first moment of estimator ˆ`changes once you
reweigh with P˜t[·] rather than Pint [·]:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
]
=
∫
A
ft
(
α′
) `(α, rt(α), yt)1{α ∈ Nout(α′)}
P˜t[α]
dα′
= `(α, rt(α), yt) · P
in
t [α]
P˜t[α]
(21)
Since P˜t[α] ≥ (1− ε)Pint [α], then from Equation (21) we have that:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
]
≤ `(α, rt(α), yt)
1− ε (22)
Additionally, since P˜t[α] ≤ (1 + ε)Pint [α], then from Equation (21) we have that:
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
]
≥ `(α, rt(α), yt)
1 + ε
(23)
We turn our attention to the second moment now, for which we will only need an upper bound.
E
αt∼Dt
[
ˆ`(α, rt(α), yt)
2
]
=
∫
A
ft
(
α′
) `(α, rt(α), yt)21{α ∈ Nout(α′)}
P˜t[α]2
dα′ =
`(α, rt(α), yt)
2Pint [α]
P˜t [α]2
≤ 1
(1− ε)2Pint [α]
(24)
Lemma B.4 still holds without any change, as it is not affected by the exact definition of ˆ`(·), and
so does Lemma B.6. Taking expectations in Lemma B.6 we obtain the following:
T∑
t=1
∑
p∈Pt+1
qt(p)E
[
ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
]
−
T∑
t=1
E
[
ˆ`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
]
≤ η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
p∈Pt+1
qt(p)E
[
ˆ`(p, rt(p), yt)
2
]
+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ(p)
)
Applying Equations (22), (23) and (24) on the latter we obtain:
1
1 + ε
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α)`(α, rt(α), yt)dα− 1
1− ε
T∑
t=1
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
≤ η
2
1
(1− ε)2
T∑
t=1
∫
A
qt(α)dα
Pint [α]
+
1
η
log
(
λ (A)
λ(p)
)
In the latter, applying Lemma B.4, multiplying both sides by 1− ε and using the fact that ε ≤ 1/2
we obtain the result. 
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Lemma B.8. Provided access to algorithms for computing the volume of a polytope and to an
in-probability oracle, Grinder has runtime complexity O(T d).
Proof of Lemma B.8. With access to algorithms that compute the volume of a polytope and to an
in-probability oracle, the complexity of Grinder is dependent solely on the number of polytopes
that get activated in the worst case. The latter depends on the number of new boundary hyperplanes
that we introduce in the action space A at each round.
If the sequence of real feature vectors {xt}Tt=1 is chosen adversarially, the number of new hyper-
planes added in each round in A is 2. So, in the worst case, after T rounds we have 2T hyperplanes
in general position in a d-dimensional space, which from Zaslavsky [34], Stanley et al. [33] are:
|Pt| = O
(
d∑
i=0
(
2T
i
))
= O
(
T d
d!
)

C Appendix for Section 4.1
C.1 Implementing Grinder for Continuous Action Spaces
In order to implement Grinder, we used the polytope library15, which is part of the TuLiP python
package. Other than some rounding-error fixes, we did not intervene with the core methods of the
package.
In order to implement the 2-stage action draw method, we first chose a polytope (according
to the probability function prescribed by Grinder) and then, by using rejection sampling from
the bounding box around the polytope, we chose the action associated with it. Note that this is
equivalent to the theoretical 2-stage draw.
In order to speed up our algorithm’s performance, we also used the heuristic of bounding the
allowable volume of any polytope to be greater than or equal to 0.01, but in all the simulations that
we tried, we saw comparable regret results even without the heuristic.
C.2 Logistic Regression Oracle
In this subsection, we will outline our implementation of the logistic regression algorithm on the
agents’ past data, which serves as an estimate of the in-probability for each action. For ease of
exposition, we provide the description of the oracle for the case of a predefined action set, and
subsequently, we outline the way it generalizes to the continuous implementation.
Before we embark on this, allow us first to observe that we already have a very crude (but
potentially useful) lower bound for every action j ∈ A. Indeed, each action always updates itself,
and actions that belong in the upper and lower polytope sets are always updated by all actions
within these sets. The latter is due to the fact that for any hyperplane chosen within these sets,
there is no possible manipulation from the perspective of the agent. We denote this crude lower
bound for each action j ∈ A by cj .
Labels are defined as lji = 0 if action j was not updated at timestep i
16, and 1 otherwise. As
a first step, this oracle computes for each action j ∈ A the probability that each action from A
updates j, by using a logistic regression17 with feature vectors the set H1:t, and L
j
1:t as the labels.
15https://github.com/tulip-control/polytope/tree/master/requirements
16In other words, action was at a distance less than 2δ from the best-response of the timestep.
17Technically, we run a different logistic regression for every action in A.
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Figure 5: Grinder vs. EXP3 for utility function from Eq. (25). From left to right: discrete A
(accurate and regression oracle), continuous A with δ = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and continuous A with
δ = 0.05, 0.3, 0.5. Solid lines correspond to average regret/loss, and opaque bands correspond to
10th and 90th percentile.
Let pji , i ∈ A correspond to the output probabilities, i.e., pji encodes the probability that action j
will be updated by action i. The in-probability of action j is ultimately defined as:
in
P[j] = max
{∑
i∈A
pjipit[i], c
j
}
At a high-level, it is not hard to see how this can generalize to the continuous grinding case;
instead of actions, one now uses whole polytopes. The implementation, however, becomes signifi-
cantly messier, as we need to propagate the history of past data for each polytope to its grinded
sub-polytopes.
C.3 Different Utility Function and Distribution of Datapoints
The utility function that we assume for the agents at this subsection, is similar to the one studied
by Dong et al. [17], specifically:
ut(αt, rt(αt), yt) = δ · 〈αt, rt(αt)〉 − ‖xt − rt(αt)‖2 (25)
for values of δ = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5. Similarly the the paper’s main body, we run Grinder
against EXP3 for a horizon T = 1000, where each timestep was repeated for 30 repetitions.
Fig. 5 presents the results for the case where +1 points are drawn as xt ∼ (N (0.7, 0.3),N (0.7, 0.3))
and the −1 labeled points are drawn from xt ∼ (N (0.4, 0.3),N (0.4, 0.3)). The performance of
Grinder compared to EXP3 is similar to the one that we saw in Sec. 4.1 for the case of the different
utility function. Grinder outperforms EXP3, and its performance degrades as the power of the
agent (i.e., δ) increases. We also see that in this case, the regression oracles are performing slightly
worse that the regression oracles for the case of the utility function analyzed in Sec. 4.1.
Finally, in Fig. 6 we present the results of our simulations of running Grinder against EXP3,
when the agents’ utility function is defined by Equation (25), and the distribution of labeled points
is the following: the +1 labeled points are drawn as xt ∼ (N (0.6, 0.4),N (0.4, 0.6)) and the −1
labeled points are drawn from xt ∼ (N (0.4, 0.6),N (0.6, 0.4)). We note that while Grinder still
outperforms EXP3 its performance has become worse than what we saw in Fig. (5). This is due to
the fact that in this new distribution of points creates much higher overlap of labels and there are
fewer points for which a perfect linear classifier exists. This is also exhibited by the fact that EXP3’s
performance is getting better in the horizon of T rounds compared to any single fixed action.
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Figure 6: Grinder vs. EXP3 for “harder” distribution of labels. From left to right: discrete A
(accurate and regression oracle), continuous A with δ = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and continuous A with
δ = 0.05, 0.3, 0.5. Solid lines correspond to average regret/loss, and opaque bands correspond to
10th and 90th percentile.
D Appendix for Section 5
Lemma D.1. Fix a r = x = (u)d, where by (u)d we denote the d-dimensional vector with u ∈
[1/4, 3/4] in every dimension. There exists a utility model for the agents, and a pair of adversarial
environments U and L such that rt(α) = xt = x,∀α ∈ A,∀t ∈ [T ], and the sequence of y1, . . . , yT
is i.i.d. conditional on the choice of the adversary, such that:
max
ν∈{U,L}
min
α?∈A
E
ν
∑
t∈[T ]
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)−
∑
t∈[T ]
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
 ≥ 1
9
√
2
√
T
Proof. We are going to show this for the case where the agents ∀t ∈ [T ] are truthful, i.e., they decide
to report rt(α) = xt, ∀α ∈ A,∀t ∈ [T ]. Of course, the learner does not know (and cannot infer)
that, so fix a δ > 0 for the δ-boundedness of the agents’ utility function. We will prove the lemma
only for deterministic strategies for the learner. As is customary, the claim for general strategies
can be concluded by averaging over the learner’s internal randomness and Fubini’s theorem.
Fix an ε > 0, and a scalar u ∈ [1/4, 3/4], and define the adversarial environments as follows: U
is such that yt = +1 with probability 1/2 + ε and yt = −1 with probability 1/2− ε, and L is such
that yt = −1 with probability 1/2 + ε and yt = +1 with probability 1/2− ε. This means that under
U , the majority of times the label is +1, and under L, the majority of times the label is −1. As a
result, under U , any action α such that 〈α,x〉 ≥ 2δ is optimal and under L, any action α such that
〈α,x〉 ≤ −2δ is optimal.
Take a sequence of actions α1, . . . , αT and let T≥δ denote the number of timesteps for which
〈αt, r〉 ≥
√
dδ, and T≤−δ the number of timesteps for which 〈αt, r〉 ≤ −
√
dδ. Since T≤−δ + T≥δ ≤ T
we get that:
E
U
[R(T )] ≥ E
U
[R(T≤−δ)]
≥
∑
t∈[T≤−δ]
[
1 ·
(
1
2
+ ε
)
− 1 ·
(
1
2
− ε
)]
≥ 2εE
U
[T≤−δ] (26)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that `(αt,x, yt) = 0 = `(α∗U ,x, yt),∀t ∈ [T≥δ] and any
optimal action α∗U under U as we reasoned before. The second inequality uses the following two
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facts: first, that `(α∗U ,x, yt) = 1,∀t ∈ [T≤−δ], i.e., the best fixed action in hindsight when one
encounters adversarial environment U is an action that estimates the label of x to be 1. Second,
that when playing against environment U , a learner incurs loss of 1 every time that she predicted
the label of x to be −1 (which happens in at least all T≤−δ timesteps), and the actual label was 1
(which happens with probability 1/2 + ε). Similarly, we also see that
E
L
[R(T )] ≥ 2εE
L
[T≥δ] (27)
Let PU ,PL the distributions of T≤−δ, T≥δ for adversarial environments U,L respectively, and let Pm
be the distribution of timesteps when yt = +1 with probability 1/2. From Pinsker’s inequality, and
denoting by KL(p, q) the KL-divergence between distributions p, q, we have the following:
E
U
[T≤−δ] ≥ E
m
[T≤−δ]− T
√
KL(PU ,Pm)
2
(28)
and
E
L
[T≥δ] ≥ E
m
[T≥δ]− T
√
KL(PU ,Pm)
2
(29)
Then, from the data processing inequality for the KL-divergence we get:
KL
(
P
U
, P
m
)
≤ TKL
(
Bern
(
1
2
+ ε
)
, Bern
(
1
2
))
≤ 4Tε2 (30)
and
KL
(
P
L
, P
m
)
≤ TKL
(
Bern
(
1
2
+ ε
)
, Bern
(
1
2
))
≤ 4Tε2 (31)
Plugging in Equations (30) and (31) in Equations (28) and (29) we get:
E
U
[T≤−δ] ≥ E
m
[T≤−δ]− Tε
√
2T
and
E
L
[T≥δ] ≥ E
m
[T≥δ]− Tε
√
2T
Finally, averaging Equations (26) and (27) and using the latter two Equations we get:
max
ν∈{U,L}
E
ν
[R(T )) ≥ EU [R(T )] + EL [R(T )]
2
≥ ε
(
T − 2εT
√
2T
)
(32)
Tuning ε = 1
3
√
2T
gives the result. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We now assume without loss of generality that 2κ = λ(A)/λ(p˜) for some
constant κ. Let Φ, such that Φ = log
(
λ(A)
λ(p˜)
)
, be a set of phases created from TΦ consecutive
timesteps in T . We create the following problem instance described for clarity in 2 dimensions, and
using truthful18 agents.
First focus on phase φ = 1 with feature vector xt = u = (1/2, 1/2), and specify the adversarial
environments U and L exactly as in Lemma D.1. Then, after T/Φ timesteps one of the two adversar-
ial environments must have caused regret of at least
√
T
162Φ (Lemma D.1). If that environment was
18This way we establish the creation of the σ-t induced polytopes from the way that we construct the sequence of
datapoints.
30
U , then it means that the majority of the labels for u is +1 and hence, the best-fixed action in hind-
sight is α∗U such that 〈α∗U ,u〉 ≥ 2δ. So fix the next phase’s feature vector to be xt = u = (1/2, 5/8).
Otherwise, if that environment was L, then it means that the majority of the labels for u is −1 and
hence, the best-fixed action in hindsight is α∗L such that 〈α∗L,u〉 ≥ 2δ and you should fix the next
feature vector to be xt = u = (1/2, 3/8). The reason for making this seemingly arbitrary choice is
that we need to guarantee that one of the best-fixed actions for all previous phases, has survived
and is still in the active set of actions in the current phase.
The general pattern that we follow is the following. At phase φ ∈ [Φ], choose feature vector
xφ =
(
1
2 ,
1
4
(
1 + κφ · 2φ
))
, where κφ is a phase-specific constant defined as follows. If at phase φ,
the adversarial environment incurring Stackelberg regret
√
T
162Φ was environment U , then, κφ+1 =
2κφ+1, else κφ+1 = 2κφ−1. This is enough to establish that at any phase φ, there exists an action
that would have been the best-fixed for all previous phases despite which sequence of adversarial
environments U,L occurred. Another way to view this is similar to the polytope partitioning
outlined in Figure 3; presenting these feature vectors, we can guarantee that the polytope that held
the best-fixed action so far, is still active. As a result, the regret for all Φ phases is equal to the sum
of regrets of each phase. Additionally, the Lebesgue measure of the smallest polytope is p
φ
and is a
non-increasing function of the phases, even if it is announced to the learner that δ = 0. As a result,
E
∑
t∈[T ]
`(αt, rt(αt), yt)
− min
α?∈A
E
∑
t∈[T ]
`(α?, rt(α
?), yt)
 ≥ log(λ(A)
λ(p˜)
)
1
9
√
2
√√√√ T
log
(
λ(A)
λ(p˜)
)

31
